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(How) Did Attack Advertisements Increase Affordable Care Act 1 
Enrollments?  2 
Abstract 3 
While literature provides an abundance of evidence on negative effects of exposure to attack advertisements on 4 
consumers’ decisions to adopt a service or product, their positive effects are sparsely investigated. We examine the 5 
effects of exposure to negative information in attack advertisements in the context of Affordable Care Act (ACA) and 6 
Common Core (CC) education standards and show that they lead to an increase in the ACA enrollments and support 7 
of the CC standards. To explain this effect, we rely on the knowledge-gap theory and show that individuals who were 8 
exposed to more attack advertisements were also more likely to independently seek information, become more 9 
knowledgeable, and consequently support these subjects.  In addition to an observational study, to test our 10 
hypotheses on the link between exposure to negative information, curiosity, and shifts in knowledge and support 11 
levels, we design and conduct a randomized experiment using a sample of 300 unique individuals. Our multi-methods 12 
research contributes to marketing literature by documenting a rare occasion in which exposure to attack 13 
advertisements leads to increased demand and unveiling the mechanisms under which this effect takes place.  14 
Key words: Attack advertisements, Information Seeking, Decision-Making Process, Multi-Methods Research 15 
1. Introduction 16 
Despite the popular belief, empirical studies on attack advertisements almost unanimously conclude that 17 
it hurts everything form box office receipts (1) to brand evaluation (2) and firm value (3). However, there 18 
are some exceptions; dissemination of negative information increases the readership of blogs (4) and sale 19 
of bad wines (5). “Low product awareness” is a major condition identified in the literature under which 20 
exposure to attack advertisements leads to increased sales (6). By analyzing book reviews published in The 21 
New York Times, Berger et al. (6) show that negative reviews help unpopular authors by increasing their 22 
visibility and making more readers aware of their books.  This paper contributes to the literature by 23 
documenting another example in which dissemination of negative information via attack advertisements 24 
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by competitors increase demand and uncovering other mechanisms through which this intriguing effect 25 
takes place.  26 
This research shows rather than having an immediate effect on consumer’s knowledge, the relationship 27 
between exposure to negative information and consumer knowledge is mediated by consumers’ curiosity. 28 
By analyzing data collected from a series of randomized experiments, we show that exposure to negative 29 
information in attack advertisements triggers an individual’s sense of curiosity which in turn will lead to 30 
higher knowledge and subsequent adoption of services and products. While we investigate the effects of 31 
attack advertisements on enrollment in health insurances provided through Affordable Care Act (ACA), 32 
later in the paper we show that our conclusions are not limited to health insurance context and are rather 33 
relevant to the rarely studied domain of negative information dissemination and attack advertisements. To 34 
examine if the observed effects have broader implications outside of the case of ACA, we conduct our 35 
experiment using the subject of Common Core (CC) education standards and show that similar mechanisms 36 
persist there as well. The consistent results that we observe in both ACA and CC cases corroborate the 37 
causal mechanisms that we hypothesize and investigate in this research.  38 
The focus of this paper distinguishes it from prior research by Berger et al. (6) and enables us to examine 39 
unique hypotheses on the positive effects of negative information. We discuss these features below. 40 
The difference between anti-ACA advertisements and book reviews is their level of information richness.  41 
As we present in appendix A, the contents of the anti-ACA advertisements are not informative. They are 42 
more rhetorical than substantive. While negative book reviews discuss the reasons for which a book is 43 
deemed to be of low quality, anti-ACA advertisements neither mention the details of the ACA nor provide 44 
any individually relatable reasons for their attack on ACA. Rather it seems that their producers assumed 45 
that public already agrees that ACA is inherently a bad phenomenon and thus there is no need to present 46 
them with more arguments against it.  47 
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Given these differences, we examine the following mechanism through which attack advertisements about 48 
ACA by its opponents, inadvertently, increased ACA enrollment. Building on information-gap theory (7), we 49 
hypothesize that exposure to negative information in anti-ACA advertisements triggers the curiosity of 50 
individuals and leads them to seek further information through other source to become more 51 
knowledgeable about ACA insurances. Although its critics argue that ACA increases the national deficit and 52 
imposes an economic burden at social level in the long run, from an individual’s perspective, like other 53 
government subsidies, ACA benefits those who take advantage of it in the short run. Consequently, those 54 
who know more about subsidized health insurances will be more likely to enroll in one.  55 
Berger et al. (6) uncovered the moderating effect of awareness on the relationship between exposure to 56 
negative information and purchase decisions. Our work theoretically contributes to the literature by 57 
uncovering a mediated process through which the relationship between exposure to negative information 58 
and purchase decisions is sequentially mediated by curiosity and increased knowledge. Moreover, we show 59 
that the effect is not necessarily limited to products with low awareness and can be observed for popular 60 
services and products such as ACA. 61 
Another closely related work is the study of Phillips et al. (8) on the voters’ responses to actual 62 
advertisements of candidates in 2004 presidential elections. They uncovered four different effects of 63 
exposure to negative information disseminated through attack advertisements: reinforcement, backlash, 64 
defensive reactance, and position change. Our study not only uncovers information seeking, triggered 65 
through curiosity, as an additional effect of exposure to negative information, but also shows that the 66 
effects of political advertisements can go beyond their targeted candidate and encompass the phenomena 67 
that were not the focus of the advertisement. For example, in the case of ACA we show that the political 68 
attack advertisements which were intended to shift voters’ preferences away from the unfavorable 69 
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candidate, lead to unintended consequences and increased ACA enrollment, a phenomenon that was not 70 
the focus of these attack advertisements.   71 
In this research we undertake two different methods and present two studies. First, in an observational 72 
study, we use publicly available datasets on various state level characteristics, ACA enrollment statistics 73 
and reports of spending on anti-ACA advertisements to quantify the effect of negative advertisements on 74 
states’ ACA enrollment ratios. Second, we test our hypothesis on the mediated effect of exposure to attack 75 
advertisements on consumers’ adoption decisions by conducting a randomized experiment on 300 76 
individuals. In this experiment, we compare the effects of exposure to both positive and negative 77 
advertisements on individuals’ curiosity, their knowledge and subsequent support for two subjects of ACA 78 
and Common Core education standards.  79 
The results of our first study indicate that spending on negative advertisements increases the ACA 80 
enrollment ratio at the state level. Our second study explains why this effect takes place; our results show 81 
that exposure to negative information via attack advertisements triggers individuals to seek further 82 
information about the subject of the advertisement, which in turn, increases their knowledge about the 83 
subject and leads their increased support.  84 
2. Theoretical Framework 85 
Ansolabehere et al. (9,10) analyzed the effects of negative campaign advertisements on electorate mobility 86 
and showed that such advertisements reduce voters’ turnout and increase their cynicism about public 87 
officials. Although their findings corroborate with those of Basil et al. (11) who also show that negative 88 
advertisements reduce positive attitudes towards candidates in a political race, recent literature in political 89 
science challenges their hypothesis and instead predicts a positive or at least natural effect on voters’ 90 
turnout. This stream of literature points to the importance of information provided through attack 91 
advertisements and argues that this additional information will enable voters to make better decisions and 92 
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motivates them to participate in elections (12,13). Krupnikov (14) consolidates these conflicting empirical 93 
results by arguing that exposure to negative information demobilize only if it happens after an individual 94 
has selected a preferred candidate and the negativity is about this selected candidate.  95 
Soroka (2016) provides a comprehensive discussion of negativity bias and documents various examples in 96 
which humans tend to prioritize negative over positive information (15). Recent experiments on negativity 97 
bias show that there is on average higher activation in response to negative stimuli than to positive stimuli 98 
(16) and negative news elicits stronger and more sustained reactions than does positive news (17), other 99 
experiments show that women are more attentive than men to negative news content (18). Interestingly, 100 
prior research documents that news consumers have a higher demand for negative news content (19).  101 
The findings of Krupnikov (14) only pertain to subjects that require high cognitive processing effort, such 102 
as evaluating political candidates. Prior research documents the primacy effect and shows that to form an 103 
opinion, individuals more heavily rely on information they receive early on than information they receive 104 
later (20), unless the subject requires the individuals to devote high processing efforts, in which they would 105 
hold judgment until they have received and processed all the information (21,22). Ein-Gar et al. (23) 106 
uncover the blemishing effect which bolsters and intensifies the primacy effect.  They show that  when a 107 
subject requires low processing effort and individuals are first presented with positive information based 108 
on which they have already created a positive opinion about the subject, presenting them with minor 109 
negative information would accentuate rather than attenuate that initial positive impression. In this 110 
research we examine the effects of exposure to positive and negative information on individuals’ opinions 111 
about subjects that require high cognitive processing. One would expect that in these situations, since 112 
individuals hold judgment until all information is processed, the sequence in which they receive the 113 
information should not affect their judgment and more importantly, receiving negative information should 114 
negatively affect their overall impression of the subject.  However, we uncover that when individuals are 115 
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first provided with negative and rhetorical messages about a potentially beneficial subject, they are more 116 
likely to independently seek further information about it, and therefore are more likely to form a positive 117 
impression of the subject.  118 
Political scientists and marketing researchers have examined cases in which the advertisements have 119 
produced uptake beyond the intended product or audience. For example, Urban and Niebler (24) examine 120 
the effects of political advertisements on campaign donations in bordering areas of noncompetitive states 121 
that receive spillover advertisements from competitive states. They show that the aggregate campaign 122 
donation from zip codes in non-contested states which were exposed to political ads was substantially more 123 
than in similar zip codes without advertisements. Other researchers have shown that unintended exposure 124 
of individuals who live in non-battleground states to advertisements during the 2000 presidential election 125 
has a strong impact on their level of persuasion (25). Using the television advertisements for 126 
antidepressants, Shapiro (26) shows that advertisements by one company leads to increased sales of similar 127 
products by rival companies. Interestingly, Sinkinson and Starc (27) observe a similar phenomenon in direct 128 
to consumer advertisements for anti-cholesterol drugs. They show that such advertisements by one 129 
company increases the sale of drugs of the non-advertised competitors in the same class. 130 
The current study contributes to the literature by investigating the unintended side-effects of exposure to 131 
attack advertisements on voters’ decision to independently seek further information about the subjects 132 
mentioned in the advertisements. Our study shows that the impact of advertisements is not limited to 133 
voting decisions and may further extend to individuals’ curiosities and perceptions about other contents of 134 
such advertisements.  135 
Information-gap theory (7) posits that curiosity - manifested as the desire to seek knowledge - is triggered 136 
when an individual is presented with a manageable knowledge gap.  As we present in appendix A, political 137 
attack advertisements which were aired during the Congress’s midterm elections heavily criticized ACA 138 
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without providing substantial information to support their arguments against it. Repeatedly attacking a 139 
concept and portraying it as a negative phenomenon without providing supporting information triggers 140 
curiosity by making individuals to feel a knowledge-gap between what they know and what they want to 141 
know. These arguments are further supported by research that shows exposure to curiosity-evoking 142 
advertisements turns an individual from a passive information processor to an active information seeker 143 
(28) and results in greater elaboration and information search as well as better learning of information  144 
(29). The knowledge gap that is created by anti-ACA advertisements is fairly manageable thanks to the 145 
wealth of easy to understand information resources about ACA. The education level of uninsured -whom 146 
ACA is specifically designed for-is very low.1 147 
Given this fact, ACA advocates designed information resources and marketing materials to specifically 148 
inform an audience with little or no formal schooling and thus we argue that the knowledge gap that results 149 
from exposure to anti-ACA advertisements will be fairly easy to fill. Therefore, we hypothesize that anti-150 
ACA advertisements create a manageable knowledge-gap and lead their audience to fill it by independently 151 
seeking further information. Those who seek more information will consequently know more about the 152 
benefits of ACA’s subsidized health insurance plans and are thus more likely to enroll in one.  153 
Our hypothesis is consistent with the models proposed by Mayzlin  et al. (30). In their theoretical work, 154 
they show that “there exists an equilibrium where the high-quality firm chooses to produce “empty 155 
messages devoid of any attribute information in order to invite the consumer to engage in search, which is 156 
likely to uncover positive information about the product.”  Our research not only tests the theory in an 157 
empirical setting with real-world data, but also by shows that the effect is not limited to “empty” positive 158 
advertisements that are run by the firms themselves to increase adoption, but rather extents to the empty 159 
                                                          
1 According to the statistics of Economic Research Initiative on the Uninsured (ERIU), 56.3 percent of uninsured 
Americans have a high school diploma as their highest level of education and among uninsured adults born outside 
the US, 73.7 percent have at most a high school diploma.  
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negative advertisements that run by opponents to decrease adoption or support of an unfavorable subject 160 
or candidate, respectively.  161 
We can formally present our hypotheses as follows:  162 
 H1: Exposure to negative information is positively associated with curiosity.  163 
 H2: Curiosity is positively associated with increased knowledge about the subject.   164 
 H3: Knowledge about the desirable features of the product is positively associated with adoption.  165 
3. Study One: Effects of Anti-ACA Advertisements on States’ Enrollment Ratios 166 
 167 
Lerman et al. (31) examine how individuals’ decision to enroll in ACA insurances are affected by their 168 
political beliefs. In a field experiment, they assigned uninsured individuals to two groups. The first group 169 
was asked to sign up for ACA insurances through a private website while the other was tasked with signing 170 
up for the insurances through ACA’s governmental website. While the rate of enrollment was equal in the 171 
two groups, Republicans were significantly more likely to signup if they were assigned to the private 172 
website. Such partisan differences in perceptions about ACA are also observed by Fowler et al. (32). They 173 
analyze the relationship between exposure to local news and advertisements about ACA and the 174 
individuals’ perception on how informed they were about and how favorable they were toward ACA.  175 
Although they did not find any differences in the relationships between exposure to information and the 176 
perception of being informed about ACA by political party, they report that exposure to news media and 177 
advertisements lead to higher favorability toward ACA among Democrats. Our second study consolidates 178 
these findings by showing how curiosity mediates the relationship between exposures to advertisements, 179 
information about and favorability towards ACA.   180 
In another closely related research, Gollust et al. (33) show that positive advertisements about ACA leads 181 
to higher rates of enrollment while attack advertisements lead to opposite effects. The difference in their 182 
findings and those of ours could possibly be due to the differences in methodological approaches; we 183 
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extend their work by explicitly dealing with the endogeneity of advertisements. Airing of attack 184 
advertisements are informed decisions that are made by political candidates with careful consideration of 185 
the audience and their potential impact. Since these advertisements are not randomly distributed among 186 
different geographical regions in the sample, they should be examined within a modeling framework that 187 
incorporates their endogeneity. Our study sheds light on our understanding of the effects of such 188 
advertisements by considering them as endogenous variables and parsing out their actual effects from 189 
those that may have been confounded by other unobserved variables.   190 
3.1. Data 191 
In this observational study, we use state-level data on anti-ACA advertisements and ACA enrollment ratios 192 
as well as multiple state-level characteristics to estimate the effects of the anti-ACA advertisements on 193 
enrollment. We also collect data on twelve variables that broadly characterize the states’ political and 194 
economic landscapes as well as the features of their health insurance markets before and after ACA 195 
implementation. The data is collected from multiple publicly available sources including Kaiser Family 196 
Foundation (KFF), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human 197 
Services (HHS), US Election Atlas, Yahoo Finance, US Census, Wesleyan Media Project (WMP) (34) and the 198 
Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). Table 1 presents the list of the variables used in this study 199 
along with their definitions and sources. Data on ACA enrollment includes those who signed up between 200 
November 15, 2014 and February 15, 2015 (the open enrollment period). We use the WMP codebook to 201 
identify the topic of political advertisements. The anti-ACA ads include the total number of 202 
advertisements run by or for Republican candidates for either House or Senate in each state through the 203 
primary and general elections in year 2014 which mention either “Prescription Drugs”, “Health Care”, 204 
“Affordable Care Act”, “Obamacare” or “Health Care Law”. Similarly, the pro-ACA ads include the total 205 
number of ads that mention similar issues but are run by Democrat candidates.  Although some media 206 
markets span between multiple states, we use the state in which the election took place to aggregate the 207 
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observations in our dataset. For example, if an ad for a candidate for a Senate seat in state A was aired in 208 
a media market that covers two states of A and B, we count that ad only for state A which was the state in 209 
which the race took place, as coded in the Wesleyan Media Project dataset. It is important to note that 210 
while ACA continued over the following years, the anti-ACA advertisements stopped after the elections in 211 
2014. Because the independent variable (Anti-ACA ads) exist only in a single year, it was impossible to 212 
undertake a panel data analysis. For all other variables, we have collected the most recent available data 213 
in February 2015.  214 
Appendix C provides a detailed explanation for including each of these variables in our analysis. Descriptive 215 
statistics of these variables are presented in Table 2.  216 
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Variable Description Source URL 
Enrollment count 
Enrollment numbers at the end of the second open enrollment period. This 
includes  number of individuals who have selected a marketplace plan through 
both state- and federal-based exchange systems and excludes those who were 
enrolled through Medicaid and CHIP programs 
HHS 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/83656/ib_2015
mar_enrollment.pdf 
ACA market size  
Total number people between ages 0 and 64 who were either uninsured or had 
private insurance 
KFF 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ 
Enrollment ratio The ratio of enrollees to ACA market size 
Authors’ 
calculation 
N/A 
Young Invincibles 
Number uninsured people between ages 18 to 34 divided by the total number of 
uninsured people  
CMS 
https://data.cms.gov/dataset/The-Number-of-
Estimated-Eligible-Uninsured-People-/pc88-ec56 
Low Income 
Number of uninsured people with income below 134% of federal poverty level 
divided by the total number of uninsured people 
CMS 
https://data.cms.gov/dataset/The-Number-of-
Estimated-Eligible-Uninsured-People-/pc88-ec56 
ACA premium 
Average premium for lowest cost silver, second lowest cost silver and lowest cost 
bronze plans (log transformed) 
HHS 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/Marketplac
ePremiums/ib_premiumslandscape.pdf 
Private Insurance 
Premium 
Average per person monthly premiums in the individual market (log transformed) KFF 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/individual-
premiums/ 
Uninsured 
Females 
Number of uninsured females divided by the total number of uninsured people CMS 
https://data.cms.gov/dataset/The-Number-of-
Estimated-Eligible-Uninsured-People-/pc88-ec56 
Uninsured 
Latinos 
Number of uninsured Latinos divided by the total number of uninsured people  CMS 
https://data.cms.gov/dataset/The-Number-of-
Estimated-Eligible-Uninsured-People-/pc88-ec56 
Liberal voters Percentage of votes for Barak Obama in 2012 presidential elections 
US Election 
Atlas 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/data.php?year=20
12&datatype=national&def=1&f=0&off=0&elect=0 
Insurance 
cancelations 
Number of cancelled insurances divided by the total number people with private 
insurance 
Yahoo! Finance 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/policy-notifications-
current-status-state-204701399.html just in case: 
washington had 92% of cancelations!  
Catholic church 
members 
Number of adherents in 2010 divided by the non-elderly population  ARDA 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Downloads/R
CMSST10_DL2.asp 
Education Percent of population with a Bachelor's degree or higher in 2009 US Census 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/educ
ation/educational_attainment.html 
Anti ACA ads 
Number of political ads in 2014 run by Republican candidates for either House or 
Senate that mention either “Health Care”, “Affordable Care Act”, “Obamacare” or 
“Health Care Law”. 
WMP 
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/ 
(Available through WMP for a fee) 
Pro ACA ads 
Number of political ads in 2014 run by Democrat candidates for either House or 
Senate that mention either “Health Care”, “Affordable Care Act”, “Obamacare” or 
“Health Care Law”.  
State-run 
exchange 
Equals to one for states that created their own Health insurance marketplaces KFF 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-
insurance-exchanges/# 
Medicaid 
expansion 
Equals to one for states that expanded their Medicaid program   KFF 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-
activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-
affordable-care-act/ 
13 
 
Table 1: Descriptions and data sources of state-level variables 217 
 218 
*Note 1: Cook Partisan Voting Index (Cook PVI) groups the political race in a congressional district into the following four categories based on how strongly it 219 
leans toward the Democratic or Republican Party, compared to the nation as a whole.  220 
 Solid: These are the districts that strongly lean towards Democratic or Republican Party and thus candidates in these districts do not face tangible 221 
competition from those of the other party.  222 
 Likely: These districts are not considered competitive but have the potential to become engaged.  223 
 Lean: These are considered competitive races, but one party has an advantage. 224 
 Toss-Up: These are the most competitive; either party has a good chance of winning.  225 
We assign a score of 1 to solid districts (which have the least competitive races), 2 to likely districts, 3 to lean districts, and 4 to toss-up districts (which have the 226 
most competitive races). Multiple districts within a state may be running midterm elections for House of Representatives. In these cases, we add the scores of 227 
all the districts within a state. We use the same scoring system for the Senate midterm elections as well (the only difference is that Senate races are be at state 228 
level). We calculate our final Competitiveness Index (CI) as the sum of the scores for the elections of both House and Senate at each state.  229 
 230 
 231 
 232 
 233 
 234 
 235 
 236 
 237 
Congress’s 
midterm 
competitiveness 
index (CI) 
Competitive index for Congress midterm elections as described in note 1* below 
Cook Political 
Report 
http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings  
and  http://cookpolitical.com/senate/charts/race-
ratings 
Population 
(Logpop) 
 State population (log transformed) 
US Census 
Bureau 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/inde
x.xhtml 
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 238 
 239 
 240 
Table 2: Mean, standard deviation and Pearson inter-correlations of state level variable 241 
The p-value of correlations are reported in parentheses242 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.Enrollment count 229178 328676 
                
  
2.ACA market size 1006447 1336935 
0.95758 
(<.0001) 
               
  
3.Enrollment ratio 0.22319 0.07726 
0.18462 
(0.1947) 
0.04497 
(0.7540) 
              
  
4.Young Invincibles 0.39875 0.02795 
-0.16522 
(0.2466) 
-0.11399 
(0.4258) 
-0.25549 
(0.0704) 
             
  
5.Low Income 0.49426 0.05846 
0.15841 
(0.2669) 
0.17658 
(0.2152) 
-0.37113 
(0.0073) 
0.26328 
(0.0619) 
            
  
6.ACA premium (log) 5.69575 0.17724 
-0.03485 
(0.8082) 
-0.07937 
(0.5798) 
0.29579 
(0.0351) 
-0.11786 
(0.4101) 
-0.20888 
(0.1413) 
           
  
7.Private Insurance 
Premium (log) 
5.57839 0.52676 
0.26080 
(0.0645) 
0.36836 
(0.0078) 
-0.02679 
(0.8519) 
0.05072 
(0.7237) 
-0.16961 
(0.2341) 
0.16676 
(0.2422) 
          
  
8.Uninsured Females 0.44318 0.02719 
0.19084 
(0.1798) 
0.20340 
(0.1523) 
-0.33388 
(0.0166) 
-0.02926 
(0.8385) 
0.29578 
(0.0351) 
-0.08869 
(0.5360) 
-0.20700 
(0.1450) 
         
  
9.Uninsured Latinos 0.14634 0.12739 
0.52338 
(<.0001) 
0.60910 
(<.0001) 
-0.18628 
(0.1906) 
-0.05300 
(0.7119) 
0.12358 
(0.3876) 
-0.19271 
(0.1755) 
0.41990 
(0.0022) 
-0.03938 
(0.7838) 
        
  
10.Liberal voters 0.48977 0.11801 
0.03759 
(0.7934) 
0.03233 
(0.8218) 
0.22262 
(0.1164) 
0.11613 
(0.4171) 
-0.09541 
(0.5054) 
0.04404 
(0.7589) 
0.27162 
(0.0538) 
-0.55477 
(<.0001) 
0.15921 
(0.2644) 
       
  
11.Insurance 
cancelations 
0.25934 0.28759 
0.09850 
(0.4917) 
0.07955 
(0.5790) 
-0.05354 
(0.7091) 
0.08621 
(0.5475) 
0.08530 
(0.5518) 
-0.03003 
(0.8343) 
-0.15173 
(0.2879) 
0.15821 
(0.2675) 
0.04843 
(0.7357) 
0.07650 
(0.5937) 
      
  
12.Catholic church 
members 
0.27710 0.17068 
0.03472 
(0.8089) 
0.06545 
(0.6482) 
0.08648 
(0.5462) 
0.28059 
(0.0461) 
-0.21576 
(0.1284) 
0.10148 
(0.4786) 
0.42770 
(0.0017) 
-0.49368 
(0.0002) 
0.38362 
(0.0055) 
0.46819 
(0.0005) 
-0.02667 
(0.8526) 
     
  
13.Education 0.27590 0.05555 
-0.03004 
(0.8342) 
-0.01946 
(0.8922) 
0.19852 
(0.1626) 
0.07600 
(0.5961) 
-0.37290 
(0.0070) 
-0.07457 
(0.6030) 
0.22212 
(0.1172) 
-0.49567 
(0.0002) 
0.21687 
(0.1264) 
0.73279 
(<.0001) 
0.14654 
(0.3048) 
0.42074 
(0.0021) 
    
  
14.State-run Exchange 0.33333 0.47610 
-0.10331 
(0.4707) 
-0.05148 
(0.7198) 
-0.05944 
(0.6786) 
0.19300 
(0.1748) 
0.06108 
(0.6702) 
-0.15105 
(0.2900) 
0.34303 
(0.0137) 
-0.39565 
(0.0041) 
0.31171 
(0.0260) 
0.54015 
(<.0001) 
0.31589 
(0.0239) 
0.33249 
(0.0171) 
0.48446 
(0.0003) 
   
  
15.Medicaid Expansion 0.52941 0.50410 
-0.18971 
(0.1824) 
-0.11956 
(0.4034) 
-0.19325 
(0.1742) 
0.29056 
(0.0386) 
-0.03913 
(0.7852) 
-0.10036 
(0.4835) 
0.28231 
(0.0447) 
-0.40436 
(0.0033) 
0.23296 
(0.0999) 
0.56307 
(<.0001) 
0.18173 
(0.2018) 
0.43905 
(0.0013) 
0.36754 
(0.0080) 
0.58333 
(<.0001) 
  
  
16. Competitiveness 
index 
6.31373 5.89403 
0.37943 
(0.0060) 
0.36768 
(0.0079) 
0.03577 
(0.8032) 
0.06519 
(0.6495) 
0.04973 
(0.7289) 
0.04204 
(0.7696) 
0.17569 
(0.2175) 
0.01075 
(0.9403) 
0.22243 
(0.1167) 
-0.02253 
(0.8753) 
0.37359 
(0.0069) 
0.15573 
(0.2752) 
-0.09556 
(0.5048) 
0.04752 
(0.7406) 
0.13146 
(0.3578) 
 
  
17.Population (log) 14.61613 1.04016 
0.72232 
(<.0001) 
0.75868 
(<.0001) 
-0.05239 
(0.7150) 
0.00119 
(0.9934) 
0.27302 
(0.0526) 
-0.27729 
(0.0488) 
0.26274 
(0.0625) 
0.18083 
(0.2041) 
0.43063 
(0.0016) 
0.05042 
(0.7253) 
0.14112 
(0.3233) 
0.09607 
(0.5025) 
-0.02395 
(0.8675) 
-0.03326 
(0.8168) 
-0.01334 
(0.9260) 
0.23431 
(0.0979) 
  
18.  Anti-ACA ads 5877 6508 
0.22681 
(0.1095) 
0.16591 
(0.2446) 
-0.08374 
(0.5591) 
0.06538 
(0.6485) 
0.25737 
(0.0683) 
-0.06217 
(0.6647) 
-0.14627 
(0.3057) 
0.42313 
(0.0020) 
-0.12296 
(0.3900) 
-0.26107 
(0.0643) 
0.15132 
(0.2891) 
-0.31259 
(0.0255) 
-0.33505 
(0.0162) 
-0.28430 
(0.0432) 
-0.09678 
(0.4993) 
0.07617 
(0.5952) 
0.22812 
(0.1074) 
 
19. Pro-ACA ads 1192 1527 
0.34197 
(0.0140) 
0.28906 
(0.0397) 
-0.05496 
(0.7017) 
-0.14348 
(0.3152) 
0.13568 
(0.3425) 
0.10534 
(0.4619) 
0.06141 
(0.6686) 
0.17392 
(0.2222) 
0.04668 
(0.7450) 
-0.08403 
(0.5577) 
0.11133 
(0.4367) 
-0.08962 
(0.5317) 
-0.20038 
(0.1586) 
-0.23463 
(0.0975) 
-0.00990 
(0.9450) 
0.17949 
(0.2076) 
0.23323 
(0.0995) 
 0.72047 
(<.0001) 
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243 
 244 
3.2. Method 245 
In order to correctly estimate the effects of anti-ACA advertisements on states’ enrollment ratios, three 246 
empirical issues need to be addressed. First, while the number of observations is relatively small, the 247 
number of state-level control variables is very large; many of these variables may be driven by the same 248 
unobserved factors and thus could be highly correlated with each other. Consequently, keeping all of the 249 
control variables in the model will significantly reduce the model’s degrees of freedom. To overcome this 250 
issue, we conducted a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and reduced the number of control variables 251 
into a set of components which best explain the variations in our dataset. The details about the PCA are 252 
available in the appendix. Second, the dependent variable is bounded between the interval of zero and 253 
one. To overcome this issue, we provide an econometric specification in which the dependent variable 254 
follows a beta distribution and use maximum likelihood method to estimate our model. The details of the 255 
model specification are available in the appendix. Third, the anti-ACA advertisements are potentially 256 
endogenous and rather than being randomly distributed, are driven by factors outside of our model. We 257 
use the competitiveness of Congress’s midterm elections as an instrumental variable to adjust for the 258 
endogeneity of the anti-ACA advertisements.  259 
To instrument for the anti-ACA advertisements, we propose to exploit the heterogeneity among the 260 
competitiveness of the midterm elections for the US Senate and the House of Representatives. An 261 
appropriate instrumental variable should satisfy two conditions. First, it should have no partial effect on 262 
the dependent variable (exogeneity). Second, it should be related with the endogenous explanatory 263 
variable (relevance).  In the following, we first provide a rationale for the choice of competitiveness of the 264 
midterm elections as an instrument and then empirically examine our arguments in Section 3.3.  265 
16 
 
As we show in appendix A, anti-ACA advertisements were a part of larger political campaigns during the 266 
Congress’s midterm elections. In the swing states such as Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina 267 
where the midterm elections were more competitive, spending on anti-ACA advertisements was much 268 
higher, and thus we expect the relevance condition to hold. On the other hand, the competitiveness of the 269 
midterm elections should not affect the ACA enrollment ratio which means that the exogeneity condition 270 
is also expected to hold. This makes the competitiveness of the midterm elections an attractive choice for 271 
an instrumental variable.  272 
3.3. Results 273 
The results of the principal component analysis are shown in Tables S3 in the appendix. We only retain the 274 
first four components since their eigenvalues are higher than one (thus 𝑗 ∈ (1,2,3,4)). Note that the 275 
components with an eigenvalue of less than one account for less variance than did the original variable and 276 
so are of little use.  These four components explain about 67% of the total variance in our dataset. We 277 
consider the four component scores (𝐶𝑖𝑗) as our main control variables in the subsequent analyses (as 278 
vectors of 𝑿 and 𝑾 matrices in equation (1)). The rotated factor matrix along with the scree and variance 279 
plots is presented in Table S2 and Figure S2 in the appendix.  280 
To correct for the endogeneity of anti-ACA advertisements, we follow the classic two stage method.  In the 281 
first stage, we run an Poisson regression in which the dependent variable is the number of anti-ACA 282 
advertisements and the right hand side variables include the instrumental variable (competitiveness of 283 
midterm elections, CI) along with the four principle components (PC1,…, PC4). As shown in the last column 284 
of Table 3, the instrument is highly significant (p-value<0.0001) and positively associated with the spending 285 
on the anti-ACA advertisements. This implies that the competitiveness index, CI, satisfies the relevance 286 
assumption. That is, Cov (𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐴𝐶𝐴 𝐴𝑑𝑠, 𝐶𝐼) ≠ 0.  287 
 288 
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Variable 
Anti-ACA ads 
(1) (2) 
CI 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
PC1 
 -0.514*** 
(0.002) 
PC2 
 -0.142*** 
(0.002) 
PC3 
 0.218*** 
(0.002) 
PC4 
 0.144*** 
(0.002)  
Constant 
8.593*** 
(0.003) 
8.420*** 
(0.003) 
                                                                                                     *P<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001 289 
Table 3: Anti-ACA ads as a function of CI, and other controls 290 
In the second stage, we use the estimates of spending on anti-ACA advertisements from the first stage, as 291 
a vector of 𝑿 and 𝑾 matrices. The estimation results of equation 1 are presented in Table 4. Note that in 292 
this table, number of pro and anti- ACA ads are scaled to 1000. The first three columns do not correct for 293 
endogeneity of the anti ACA advertisements; this implies that 𝑿 and 𝑾 matrices include the original values 294 
of anti-ACA spending rather than its estimates from the first stage. The last three columns represent the 295 
maximum likelihood estimation results of equation (1) after correcting for endogeneity of the anti-ACA 296 
advertisements. As shown in column (6) of Table 4, the coefficient of anti-ACA advertisements is estimated 297 
as 0.1437. This is the unbiased estimate of the coefficient of anti-ACA advertisements and is significant and 298 
positive.  299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
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Variable 
1 
Without IV 
2 
Without IV 
3 
Without IV 
4 
IV(2nd stage) 
5 
IV(2nd stage) 
6 
IV(2nd stage) 
Location Submodel (estimates of 𝜷) 
Anti ACA ads (× 1000) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.022 
(0.020) 
0.144*** 
(0.039) 
0.144*** 
(0.039) 
Pro-ACA ads (× 1000) 
 
 
-0.058 
(0.049) 
-0.012 
(0.039) 
 -0.011 
(0.030) 
PC1 
 0.101* 
(0.055) 
0.111* 
(0.055)  
0.425*** 
(0.102) 
0.421*** 
(0.102) 
PC2 
 -0.078 
(0.055) 
-0.064 
(0.056)  
0.034 
(0.058) 
0.035 
(0.058) 
PC3 
 -0.126** 
(0.052) 
-0.137** 
(0.052)  
-0.267*** 
(0.061) 
-0.267*** 
(0.060) 
PC4 
 -0.157** 
(0.050) 
-0.174** 
(0.051)  
-0.298 
(0.060) 
-0.298*** 
(0.059) 
Constant 
-1.214 
(0.079) 
-1.290 
(0.073) 
-1.287*** 
(0.072) 
-1.101*** 
(0.133) 
-2.115*** 
(0.239) 
-2.099*** 
(0.242) 
Fit statistics 
-2ln L -123.59 -140.21 -141.59 -124.71 -151.27 -151.40 
AIC -117.59 -126.21 -125.59 -116.71 -137.27 -135.40 
                                                                                                                                                           *P<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001 305 
Table 4: Beta regression estimation results of equation (1)  306 
Note that without correcting for endogeneity of Anti-ACA Ads, the model will result in underestimation of 307 
the coefficient.  308 
To test the robustness of our results, we consider an alternative way of counting the political 309 
advertisements in media markets that span multiple states. We count the political advertisements in such 310 
markets for all of the states that they span. The results remain consistent with those presented in table 4. 311 
3.4. Limitations  312 
In the following, we discuss the limitation of first study and explain how we overcome them in the next 313 
study. The number of observations is restricted to the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Given the lack 314 
of granular datasets, we are not able to increase our sample size. This reduces the statistical power in our 315 
estimates and therefore, it will be very difficult to draw causal conclusions from its findings. We could not 316 
run the analysis at a more granular level such as media market area because enrollment data at more 317 
granular levels is only available for 37 states that did not run their own health insurance exchange platform2 318 
                                                          
2 https://aspe.hhs.gov/plan-selections-zip-code-health-insurance-marketplace-april-2015 
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and instead used Healthcare.gov. Additionally, at the media market level analysis we would lose even more 319 
data because many of the control variables that are used in the main analysis and are available through 320 
various sources at state level, are not available at media market level.  321 
To address this concern, we collected data about as many different state level characteristics as we could 322 
in order to control for as much variation as possible. We also used instrumental variables and estimated 323 
our model using 2SLS method to adjust for the endogeneity of the anti-ACA advertisements. Despite these 324 
remedies, we acknowledge that since our data are at state level, causal inferences cannot be made. We 325 
conduct the first study only to observe the effects of negative advertisements on ACA enrollments, and 326 
then use these observations to guide us in the second study in which we carefully test our hypotheses using 327 
individual level data collected through various experiments. In other words, the first study shows us what 328 
the effect of negative advertisements was while the second study helps us explain why such effect took 329 
place.   330 
4. Study Two: Effects of Information Exposure on Individuals’ Curiosity, Increased Knowledge and 331 
Increased Support 332 
As discussed earlier, we hypothesize that exposure to anti-ACA advertisements positively affects the 333 
individuals’ decision to adopt the service or product through the following mechanism. Exposure to 334 
negative information creates a sense of curiosity which entices individuals to learn more about the service 335 
through various resources such as conversing with others, reading articles and listening to others’ 336 
discussion about it. This will lead to increased awareness about the existence and the benefits of health 337 
insurance for individuals. Ceteris paribus, those who are more aware of ACA health insurances are more 338 
likely to purchase them. 339 
4.1. Method 340 
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In the following, we describe the design of the experiment which consists of six consecutive steps. At the 341 
first step, we randomly assign individuals to three groups that are respectively named positive, negative 342 
and control.  343 
At the second step, in all of the groups, we measure the baseline knowledge of the individuals about the 344 
ACA by asking them to take a short quiz which includes five questions. The level of their knowledge is 345 
determined in a 0 to 5 scale based on how they score in the quiz.  We also ask them to express how much 346 
they support ACA in a 5-point Likert scale.  347 
In the third step, we respectively show individuals in positive and negative groups a 30 second positive or 348 
negative advertisement video about ACA. This video is considered the treatment in our experiment. The 349 
individuals in control group do not watch any advertisement video.  Both the positive and negative 350 
advertisement videos are actual advertisements that were run during the mid-term elections and are 351 
retried from YouTube.com. 352 
In the fourth step, we present individuals with four different topics and ask them to select the option which 353 
they are interested to know more about. ACA was one of the topics, the remaining three topics were not 354 
relevant to ACA and focused on other issues such as education policy and lesser known politicians. We 355 
measure their curiosity, as a binary variable, based on this selection. If the individual opts to know more 356 
about ACA, then we consider him to be curious about the topic. If he chooses one of the other three topics, 357 
then we consider him incurious. The reason that we provide more options to users in because we assumed 358 
that if users were only given the option to whether or not learn more about ACA, they will be more 359 
susceptible to priming effect as compared to a situation where they have more options and can choose 360 
from multiple subjects. We remove the potential noise by operationalizing the curiosity as a binary variable 361 
which is equal to one only if a user has chosen to learn more about ACA and zero if any of the other 362 
nonrelated subjects were selected. 363 
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In the fifth step, based on their selection in the previous step, we present individuals a simple paragraph 364 
(about 5 sentences) which includes information about the topic of their choice. The individuals could find 365 
the answer to all of the quiz questions in the information provided about the ACA, had they chosen to know 366 
more about this topic.  367 
Finally, after they have read the information piece, in the sixth step we ask individuals to take the quiz again 368 
to measure their knowledge post treatment. The questions in the quiz are identical to the ones that were 369 
asked at the beginning of the experiment. We also ask them to express their level of support about ACA 370 
again.  371 
This design allows us to study how exposure to a certain kind of advertisement triggers an individual’s 372 
curiosity and how it could subsequently lead to increased knowledge about and support of the 373 
advertisement’s subject.  More importantly, the experiment design allows us to estimate the causal effects 374 
of multiple mediator variables. Because we have measures of knowledge and support (or enrollment) 375 
before and after exposure to different types of advertisements, we can attribute the differences in the 376 
curiosity and the subsequent shifts in measures of knowledge and support to differences in advertisement 377 
treatment.  378 
To examine the role of prior knowledge and personal opinions of individuals on the effect of the 379 
advertisements, we repeat our experiment on Common Core (CC) education standards instead of ACA. 380 
Common Core education standards constitute a much less controversial issue as compared with ACA and 381 
thus the political opinions and convictions of respondents may play a less salient role on how they respond 382 
to the questions in the experiment. Examining CC in addition to ACA, also broadens the focus of this study 383 
and adds to the generalizability of our findings. 384 
For both topics (ACA and CC), we conduct our experiment on samples from populations inside and outside 385 
of the US. Because both ACA and CC are topics that are more discussed in national politics, individuals 386 
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outside of the US may be less educated about these topics as compared with the individuals who live in the 387 
US. Therefore the sample of individuals outside of the US will serve as a proxy for low information voters. 388 
Also, individuals outside of the US are much less likely to have a viewpoint about these topics based on 389 
their political party affiliations. Given the differences in information and political convictions between those 390 
who live in the US and their international counterparts, it is interesting to examine how exposure to 391 
advertisements affects these two samples differently.  We thus have twelve samples: 2 topics (ACA, CC) ×392 
 3 treatment levels (positive, negative, no advertisement) × 2 populations (US and international). We used 393 
Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit 300 individuals to participate in our study. 394 
We used the following videos as treatments for positive and negative advertisements about ACA and CC. 395 
 Pro-ACA:   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NKVkJE0xRA 396 
 Anti-ACA:   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N-GF-XDVIM 397 
 Pro Common Core:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moOBWJYSI_U 398 
 Anti-Common Core:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j2_NPN2eI6E 399 
 400 
4.2. Results 401 
Sample characteristics of participants in ACA and CC experiments are presented in Tables S5 and S6 in the 402 
appendix, respectively.  In each table, the left panel shows the characteristics of the sample drawn from 403 
the population inside the United States and the right panel shows the characteristics of the sample drawn 404 
from the population outside of the United States. We can observe that the variables in each of the three 405 
arms of the experiment have very similar distributions. This confirms that the subjects are randomly 406 
assigned to the experiment groups.  407 
We first present descriptive statistics on the effects of the advertisement type on three outcomes of 408 
curiosity, increase in knowledge and increase in support among the individuals sampled from populations 409 
inside and outside of the US.  While curiosity, increase in knowledge and increase in support are all higher 410 
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in the group of individuals who were exposed to negative advertisements for both topics of ACA and CC, 411 
this difference is only statistically significant in some of the cases as detailed below.  Distributions of 412 
baseline knowledge and support for ACA and CC among the two samples of individuals inside and outside 413 
of the US are presented, respectively, in figures A3 and A4 at the appendix.   414 
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c 1 shows the effects of advertisements on the sample of individuals in the US on 415 
respectively their curiosity, awareness increase and support increase.  For the ACA topic, the analysis results 416 
confirm the effects of advertisement type on curiosity (𝐹(74,2) = 5.38, 𝑝 < 0.01) and increase in support 417 
(𝐹(74,2) = 3.30, 𝑝 < 0.05).  Figures 2a, 2b and 2c shows the effects of advertisements on the sample of 418 
individuals outside of the US on respectively their curiosity, awareness increase and support increase.  For 419 
the ACA topic, only the mean of curiosity varies significantly among the three advertisement groups 420 
(𝐹(75,2) = 4.95, 𝑝 < 0.01). For the common core standards topic, both the curiosity (𝐹(75,2) = 13.12, 𝑝 <421 
0.0001) and the increase in support (𝐹(75,2) = 2.95, 𝑝 < 0.1) are significantly different among the three 422 
groups of the advertisements.  423 
While through the descriptive statistics we can observe the differences among the treatment groups, we 424 
cannot examine the interplay between the concepts of curiosity and shifts in knowledge and support.  Since 425 
we have measured knowledge and support pre and post exposure to treatment, we can examine the causal 426 
links through a structural equation modeling approach similar to the one presented in previous section. 427 
While the classic mediation analyses methods can analyze the cases with only one mediator, the SEM 428 
method applied here allows us to examine the causal effects of two mediators. That is, we can examine the 429 
effect of advertisement type on curiosity and subsequently on increase in knowledge and support. The 430 
treatment variable in our analysis is “type of the advertisement” which has three categories (positive, 431 
negative, or no ads). The estimation method, however, can only be used with nominal variables with no 432 
more than two categories. We thus transform the treatment variable into two binary variables and estimate 433 
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the model twice. First, we only consider the observations in the negative and control group to estimate the 434 
effect of negative advertisements as compared with the control group. Second, we only consider the 435 
observations in the positive and control groups to estimate the effects of positive advertisements as 436 
compared with the control group. The results are reported in Table 5. As reported in column 1, the curiosity 437 
of the sample of individuals in the US who were exposed to negative advertisements about ACA was 0.53 438 
units higher than those who were not exposed to any kind of advertisements. The increased knowledge 439 
among these individuals is 1.55 units higher than those in the control group. Also, their increased level of 440 
support is 0.49 units higher than those that were not exposed to any kind of advertisements. As reported 441 
in column 2, those who watched positive advertisements were .32 units more curious than those who did 442 
not. However, the level of curiosity among them was less than that of individuals who watched negative 443 
advertisements (0.53 vs 0.32). The subsequent increase in knowledge of the individuals in the positive 444 
group about ACA was 0.76 units higher than those in the control group. Again, the control group shows 445 
lower levels of increased knowledge when compared with the negative group (1.55 vs 0.76). The increased 446 
level of support for ACA among the individuals who watched positive advertisement is not statistically 447 
different from those who did not watch any kind of advertisements. The same pattern of effects can be 448 
observed among the individuals outside of the US (columns 3 and 4). The results are similar for 449 
advertisements about Common Core education standards among individuals both inside US (columns 5 and 450 
6) and outside the US (columns 7 and 8). Comparing the effects of positive and negative advertisements 451 
across all the samples and topics show that negative advertisements consistently have much stronger 452 
effects in arousing the curiosity of individuals.   453 
 454 
 455 
 456 
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Dependent Variable /  
Independent Variable 
ACA Common Core Standards 
Inside USA Outside USA Inside USA Outside USA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Support Increase 
Knowledge Increase 
 
0.49*** 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.31*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
Knowledge Increase 
Curiosity 
 
1.55*** 
(0.35) 
 
0.76*** 
(0.07) 
 
2.45*** 
(0.38) 
 
2.67*** 
(0.31) 
 
1.49*** 
(0.36) 
 
0.55*** 
(0.10) 
 
3.01*** 
(0.33) 
 
2.00*** 
(0.48) 
Curiosity 
Exposure to negative 
ads vs. no ads 
 
Exposure to positive 
ads vs. no ads  
 
0.53*** 
(0.11) 
 
 
 
 
0.32** 
(0.11) 
 
0.56*** 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
(0.13) 
 
0.39** 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
(0.14) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.09) 
 
 
 
 
0.42*** 
(0.12) 
Fit Indices         
                         𝜒2, (𝑑𝑓) 144.26,(6) 77.15,(6) 20.62,(6) 260.61,(6) 
NFI 0.86 0.90 0.97 0.94 
NNFI 0.75 0.87 1.33 0.89 
CFI 0.87 0.93 1.00 0.95 
p<0.05, ** p<01, *** p<0.001 457 
Table 5: Path coefficients 458 
Interestingly, curiosity of individuals outside of the US leads to much higher levels of increase in their 459 
knowledge about both topics.  For example, as shown in column 1, the level of knowledge of individuals in 460 
the US who watched negative advertisements about ACA increases by 1.55 units, while as shown in column 461 
3, the level of knowledge about ACA among their counterparts outside of the US increases by 2.45. Another 462 
interesting finding of this study is that for individuals in the US, in the group who watched negative 463 
advertisements, increased knowledge has a more salient effect on increasing the level of support for both 464 
of the topics as compared to the ones who watched positive advertisements. For example, as shown in 465 
column 1, increased knowledge among those inside the US, leads to .49 units of increase in support for 466 
those who watched negative advertisements, while as shown in column 2, this size of this effect is only 0.06 467 
and not statistically significant for those who watched positive advertisements. We observe similar effects 468 
for the topic of Common Core education standards as shown in columns 5 and 6. However, for individuals 469 
outside of the US, the magnitude of the effect of increased knowledge on increased support for both topics 470 
among those who were exposed to negative advertisements is not very much higher than on those who 471 
26 
 
watched negative advertisements. For example, as shown in columns 3 and 4, respectively, increased 472 
support for ACA among samples outside of the US is 0.29 in negative group and 0.27 in positive group which 473 
are not statistically different. As shown in columns 7 and 8, the size of these effects are respectively equal 474 
to 0.31 and 0.17 in negative and positive groups. 475 
The power of our tests would have been much higher with a larger sample size. Although our sample size 476 
is small, we have run four independent experiments (ACA in the USA, ACA outside of the USA, CC in the 477 
USA and CC outside of the USA) and the results of all four experiments are consistent with each other and 478 
confirm our hypotheses. This consistency of results diminishes the concerns over the power of tests of our 479 
hypotheses to some extent.  480 
4.3. Limitations 481 
The content of an advertisement and the emotions that it provoke can affect how individuals make 482 
decisions (35,36). As Corrigan and Brader (37) note, “Ads are not merely negative or positive; they also 483 
appeal to a variety of emotions, evoke associations to various groups in society, and differ in the extent and 484 
nature of their issue content, to name just a few salient attributes. Potential effects also go beyond 485 
mobilizing or demobilizing turnout to include influencing what voters learn, and how they form opinions.” 486 
Since we have used real advertisements in our experiment, it would be extremely difficult for us to control 487 
for their content or the type of emotions they provoke in the audience. To overcome this issue, we have 488 
tried our best to choose the video treatments that their content are as similar to each other as possible. 489 
Note that because these advertisements were created by different parties with different purposes and for 490 
different target groups, their content will inevitably be different from each other. For example, the Anti-491 
ACA ads are more focused on creating a sense of fear from the involvement of government in the 492 
healthcare system while pro-ACA advertisements are more focused on highlighting the potential benefits 493 
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of the law for citizens. Because of this limitation, our results in this experiment may be confounded by the 494 
content of the advertisements.  495 
The other limitation of this study is its measurement of curiosity. We have asked the respondents to choose 496 
from a list of available topics and because of the potential priming effects, they may have been inclined to 497 
choose the subject of ad, without much curiosity. In future studies, one could use more precise measures 498 
of curiosity, for example, one could ask the respondents to type a subject which they are interested to 499 
know more about instead of just choosing from the available option. In the current study, we could not 500 
implement such approach because we needed to automate the process for an online experiment in which 501 
the additional information are shows to the users based on their choices. This technical limitation 502 
prevented us from allowing users to type in any topic they preferred because we could only provide 503 
additional information on a limited set of topics. Finally, the other limitation of this study is its relatively 504 
small sample size which does not provide enough power to examine additional effects, such as differential 505 
partisan responses.  506 
5. Discussion  507 
Prior research has examined the effects of negative information on individuals’ opinions about subjects 508 
that do not require high cognitive processing. In this research we examine a situation in which the subject 509 
requires high cognitive processing and show that negative, rhetorical messages that are void of any 510 
substantial information will positively affect the individuals’ impressions about the subject.  We also show 511 
that positive messages are not as effective as their negative counterparts and use the information gap 512 
theory to argue that negative messages are more likely to trigger the curiosity of individuals and if the 513 
subject or idea is potentially beneficial for the individuals, they are more likely to support it based on the 514 
information they obtain from independently seeking knowledge about it from other sources.  515 
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Academic research has cast doubts on the old adage that “any publicity is good publicity” and has shown 516 
that negative publicity most often leads to negative outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, the study of  517 
(6) is the only one in the literature that documents the positive effects of negative publicity and identifies 518 
low product awareness as a condition under which negative publicity leads to increase in sales. Our paper 519 
contributes to the literature by documenting another case of positive effects of exposure to negative 520 
information and examining other conditions under which these effects could be observed.  (6) uncovered 521 
the moderating effect of awareness on the relationship between exposure to negative information and 522 
purchase decisions. The theoretical contribution of the current work is that it uncovers a mediated process 523 
through which the relationship between negative information and purchase decisions is sequentially 524 
mediated by curiosity and knowledge.  525 
In this research, we analyzed the effects of anti-ACA advertisements and showed that these advertisements 526 
led to an increase in the ACA enrollment. To explain this relationship, we relied on the knowledge-gap 527 
theory and argued that exposure to negative information creates a knowledge-gap among individuals and 528 
leads them to fill it by seeking more information about the advertised subject. This will consequently lead 529 
to higher knowledge and support. For example, in the case of ACA, assuming that subsidized health 530 
insurances are rational economic choices for individuals, we expect the more knowledgeable individuals to 531 
also be more likely to enroll in ACA health insurances. To test our hypotheses, we designed an experiment. 532 
The measurement and comparison of curiosity, knowledge and support before and after being exposed to 533 
negative, positive or no information allowed us to examine how exactly individuals are affected by different 534 
kinds of advertisements about different subject. The results of this study support our main contention that 535 
exposure to negative information triggers the curiosity of individuals much more than positive 536 
advertisements. Such increased curiosity will lead to higher shifts in knowledge and subsequent support of 537 
the subjects focused by the advertisements. By testing our hypothesis on both Common Core education 538 
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standards and ACA, we showed that the effects are not limited to ACA context and hold across different 539 
subjects and populations. 540 
The current study has several limitations. First, there may be more precise metrics for the effects of 541 
advertisements than the total dollar amount of spending. The metric used in our first study collectively 542 
measures the reach, as the total number of unique people exposed to the advertising, and the frequency, 543 
as the total number of times that a person is exposed to the advertisement. Although advertisers have long 544 
debated the tradeoff between reach and frequency, we do not have access to datasets that provide these 545 
alternative metrics and thus cannot distinguish their effects in the first study. This limitation is partially 546 
addressed in the second study where we use the frequency of exposure to advertisements as a more 547 
refined measure.  Second, our dataset only includes spending on anti-ACA advertisements and does not 548 
provide data on pro-ACA advertisements. To overcome this issue, we have used the potential market size 549 
as a proxy for pro-ACA advertisements and have also included a binary variable to capture the ACA’s 550 
grassroots advocacy efforts. Although in the first study the measure of anti- and pro-ACA advertisements 551 
are not the same, in the second study, we overcome this limitation by inquiring about exposure to both 552 
pro- and anti-ACA advertisements in the same scale.  553 
Third, in a controlled setting such as the one we used in the second study, it is much easier to demonstrate 554 
and measure curiosity and information-seeking behavior that it is in the outside environment. Also, the cost 555 
of information seeking in our experiment is minimal as compared to the actual cost that potential ACA 556 
enrollees incur for independent acquisition of knowledge about insurances. The optimal research method 557 
to examine this question would have been a prospective cohort study in which a group of individuals would 558 
be followed to see how their behavior changes as a result of their exposure to negative advertisements. 559 
However, we had to limit ourselves to the experimental design and abandon the prospective design for two 560 
reasons. First, due to rarity of negative advertisements, it is very difficult to find an opportunity to conduct 561 
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this research following actual observations outside of a research lab.  Second, even if we have the 562 
opportunity to study the effects of negative advertisements outside of a controlled experiment, ensuring 563 
that exposure to negative advertisements is random and truly exogenous is very difficult. For example, in 564 
the case of ACA, some individuals would be more exposed to anti-ACA advertisements due to self-selecting 565 
certain media outlets based on their political views which are also correlated with their decision to purchase 566 
such insurances. A controlled experiment in which we can randomize the exposure to negative 567 
advertisements is therefore a tradeoff between the internal and external validity of our findings.  568 
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